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Executive Summary 
Over the last two decades a consensus has been reached that there are forces which lead to 
the inception of migration and to the perpetuation of movement. Taken together, these can 
be understood as the ‘drivers’ of migration. ‘Drivers’ are then the factors which get 
migration going and keep it going once begun. This paper attempts to identify key drivers of 
migration and explores different ways in which they may be configured. 
Explanations of the inception and perpetuation of migration have focused on disparities in 
conditions between different places. Poverty was at first held to be a key driver of migration. 
However, since the early 1990s it has been recognised that the poorest often cannot migrate 
since resources are needed to do so, especially for international migration. This has led to 
much debate about the relationship between migration and development, in particular 
whether development can reduce the pressures that drive migration or in fact can stimulate 
more migration by giving people the resources to move. 
The paper explores the relationship between determinants of migration which are often 
deeply embedded in the economic, social, political, cultural and environmental context, and 
more immediate factors. It suggests that it may be useful to distinguish between 
predisposing, proximate, precipitating and mediating factors. 
Predisposing factors contribute to the creation of a context in which migration is more likely. 
Examples include structural disparities between places of migrant origin and destination shaped 
by the macro-political economy. Such predisposing factors are outcomes of broad processes such 
as globalisation, environmental change, urbanisation and demographic transformation. 
Proximate factors have a more direct bearing on migration and derive from the working out 
of the predisposing or structural features. In countries and regions of origin, they could 
include a downturn in the economic or business cycle, a turn for the worse in the security or 
human rights environments, or marked environmental degeneration, including the effects of 
climate change. In places of destination, proximate factors might include opportunities that 
open up as a result of economic upturn. 
Precipitating factors are those that actually trigger departure. They may be found in the 
economic sphere, including financial collapse, a leap in unemployment, or the disintegration 
of health, education or other welfare services. Or they may be located in the political or 
security sphere, and include persecution, disputed citizenship, or outbreak of war. ‘Natural’ 
or environmental disasters can also be precipitating factors. This is the arena in which 
individual and household decisions to move or stay put are made. 
Mediating factors enable, facilitate, constrain, accelerate, diminish or consolidate migration. 
Facilitating factors include the presence and quality of transport, communications, information 
and the resources needed for the journey and transit period. Constraining factors include the 
absence of such infrastructure and the lack of information and resources needed to move. 
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Combinations of these predisposing, proximate, precipitating and mediating ‘drivers’ shape 
the conditions, circumstances or environment within which people make choices whether to 
move or stay put, or have such decisions thrust upon them. 
This framework is applied to two migration orders as indicative cases: within South-East Asia 
(the migration of Indonesian domestic workers in Singapore and Malaysia) and between 
South Asia and the Middle East (migration from Bangladesh to the Gulf). 
The paper then turns to other dimensions of drivers that need consideration: 
Locality: Some drivers might be associated more strongly with the area of origin, such as 
demographic or environmental pressures. Others may be centred around the area of 
destination, such as immigration policies. Still others may help to shape the journey, such as 
geographical proximity. Drivers may also operate across these locations, transnationally or 
translocally. 
Scale: Drivers operate at different geographical scales, from the local, national and regional 
to the global and at different social scales, from the individual, household or family to the 
community and wider society. 
Duration or timeframe: Drivers may operate over different timescales – from acute, sudden 
onset upheavals to chronically unfolding conditions. 
Depth or tractability: Some drivers operate on the surface of society, and may be liable to 
change readily with contextual shifts, while others are more deeply embedded and intractable. 
Drivers do not work in isolation to initiate movement or to shape it once under way. Instead, 
migration drivers work in combination – in what can be termed driver complexes – to shape 
the specific form and structure of population movements. In any one migration flow, several 
different ‘driver complexes’ may themselves interconnect in shaping the eventual direction 
and nature of a group's movement. 
To illustrate this the paper considers two migration corridors involving combinations of 
drivers – that connecting Afghanistan with Iran and Pakistan and that connecting the Somali 
regions to southern Africa – to identify in schematic fashion three sets of driver complexes 
operating at the place of origin, on the journey and in the destination area. The analysis 
indicates that, like individual drivers, such driver complexes may interact with one another 
and also shift in significance over time. 
The challenge is to establish whether and in what circumstances some drivers are more 
important than others, and which combinations of drivers are more potent than others. This 
will lay the groundwork for exploration of the possibility that some drivers are amenable to 
policy interventions. Proximate and mediating drivers rather than the structural and 
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precipitating spheres appear to have greater potential for policy intervention to reduce poverty 
and optimise development. 
6 
Drivers of migration 
Over the last two decades a consensus has been reached that there are forces which lead to the 
inception of migration and to the perpetuation of movement (Massey et al. 1998). Taken 
together, these can be understood as the ‘drivers’ of migration. ‘Drivers’ are then the factors 
which get migration going and keep it going once begun. This paper attempts to identify key 
drivers of migration and explores different ways in which they may be configured. It points to 
ways to assess their different significance or weight, and to investigate their relationship with 
development and poverty reduction. The paper gives an indication of the extent of the existing 
evidence, draws attention to research that needs to be done in this area, and points to the 
future shape of Research Programme Consortium (RPC) research on the drivers theme. 
1. Approaches to the drivers of migration 
Explanations of the inception and perpetuation of migration have focussed on disparities in 
conditions between different places driving movement. So-called ‘push-pull’ models in some of 
the classical literature suggested that migrants were pushed by low incomes in their countries or 
regions and pulled by better prospects in more affluent areas: sometimes conceptualised as 
equilibrium models, and initially focussed on internal migration, these approaches held that 
migration would result in these disparities eventually balancing out (Lee 1966; Harris and Todaro 
1970). Critics of this neo-classical approach argued that long-standing inequities deriving from 
centuries of exploitation of poor countries by rich ones drove migration, which was perpetuated 
by the structures of labour markets in richer countries (Castles and Kosack 1973; Sassen 1988). 
Other explanations have been sought at the micro or meso level, in household decision-making 
and in social networks. Some have seen migration as a household strategy motivated by the 
need to spread risk, rather than an individual matter (Stark 1991). Others have underlined the 
importance of chains, networks and culture in keeping migration going once established by 
pioneers (Boyd 1989). 
Poverty was at first held to be a key driver of migration. However, since the early 1990s it has 
been recognised that the poorest often cannot migrate since resources are needed to do so, 
especially for international migration (Tapinos 1990). It is therefore typically not the ‘poorest of 
the poor’ who migrate (UNDP 2009). While there may be a strong relationship between 
migration, poverty and its alleviation, poverty in itself may not be a driver of migration (Van 
Hear and Sorensen 2003). Acknowledgement of this has led to much debate about the 
relationship between migration and development, in particular whether development can 
reduce the pressures that drive migration or in fact can stimulate more migration by giving 
people the resources to move (for reviews of the debate on migration and development, see 
Spaan et al. 2005; Skeldon 2008; Faist 2008; de Haas 2010). 
Some of these debates have been reflected in the policy field, where there has long been 
concern to address the ‘root causes’ of migration. Essentially this has meant that initiatives 
aiming to reduce migration (especially from the ‘global South’ to the ‘global North’) by 
7 
addressing the factors held to drive migration, especially violent conflict, disparities in living 
standards, and poverty in countries migrants come from: promoting development, alleviating 
poverty and reducing conflict in origin countries are thus the means to these ends. This policy 
thrust developed in the 1980s in the context of forced migration but later came to be applied 
to economic migration as well (Castles and Van Hear 2011). For example, efforts were made 
from the later 1990s to integrate approaches to migration and asylum in European Union policy 
(Boswell 2003). These included measures to alleviate migration pressure through development 
and conflict prevention. Concern with root causes, determinants and drivers has fed into recent 
international policy discussions, in initiatives such as the Global Commission on Migration and 
Development (2003-5), the UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (2006) and 
the ongoing Global Forum on Migration and Development. 
What follows reflects this evolution of analytical and policy thinking on the causes, 
determinants or drivers of migration. It attempts to synthesise and re-cast this thinking in a 
form which aims to be helpful in shaping RPC research and its application to policy. In the next 
section we first look at ways in which drivers may be identified and set out a framework for 
understanding them. In the following section we apply the framework to two illustrative cases, 
drawing on work by RPC partners in Bangladesh and Singapore. We then refine the framework 
by looking at different dimensions of drivers of migration, and introduce the notion of driver 
complexes or configurations. We apply this refined framework to two migratory streams – 
those of Afghans and Somalis – that feature both ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ migration. Finally, we 
review the arguments and reflect on the possibilities and challenges of policy intervention into 
drivers of migration. 
2. Identifying drivers 
The Department for International Development (DfID) developed an approach to ‘drivers of 
change’ in the early 2000s (DfID 2003). It saw the approach as a way of ‘understanding the 
political economy of poverty reduction in developing countries’ (DfID 2003: 2). The approach 
involved directing attention ‘to the structural and institutional factors likely to 'drive' change in 
the medium term, and to the underlying interests and incentives that affect the environment 
for reform’. DfID understood drivers of change to be ‘the interaction between structural 
features, formal and informal institutions and individual agents’ (2003: 3, emphasis in the 
original). Structural features included the history of state formation, natural and human 
resources, economic and social structures. Institutions included the rules structuring the 
behaviour of agents, both formal and informal. Agents were individuals and organisations 
pursuing particular interests. There were causal links among the three spheres. 
In our view this approach broadly still holds good, and in what follows we apply a modified 
version of it to the migration field, which we suggest is applicable to both ‘forced’ and 
‘voluntary’ migration, as well as to both internal and international migration. 
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Key questions include how, where and when drivers operate to shape migration. They may 
operate at different scales and levels of social structure, for example. Drivers may operate in 
different locations – at places of origin, transit and destination. They may influence migration 
over different timeframes – as Massey et al. (1998: 42) observe, ‘the conditions that initiate 
international movement may be quite different from those that perpetuate it across time and 
space.’ Accounts of the inception and perpetuation of migration need to account for these 
different dimensions. 
As a starting point, we explore the relationship between determinants of migration, which are 
often deeply embedded in the economic, social, political, cultural and environmental context, 
and more immediate factors. There has been a longstanding debate on such dynamics. Drawing 
on the work of Giddens, Richmond (1994) suggested that there were factors constraining and 
enabling migration of proactive and reactive kinds. He identified what he called predisposing 
factors, structural constraints, precipitating events and enabling circumstances. In a modification 
of this approach, Van Hear (1998) suggested that predisposing, proximate, precipitating and 
intervening factors shaped what he called migration orders. 
We take these ideas as a point of departure for developing our conceptual framework. 
However, we seek to refine this categorisation of factors by noting that one factor may recur 
in more than one arena. Rather than ascribe particular factors to a category, we see them as 
having a range of functions in migration processes: 
Predisposing factors contribute to the creation of a context in which migration is more likely. 
Examples include structural disparities between places of migrant origin and destination 
shaped by the macro-political economy. Such predisposing factors may be outcomes of broad 
processes such as globalisation, environmental change, urbanisation and demographic 
transformation. Economic disparities between territories sending and receiving migrants 
include differences in earnings, livelihoods and living standards shaped by the unfolding of the 
global political economy and its inequities. What might be called political disparities include the 
relative prevalence of conflict, persecution and other dimensions of human rights and human 
security, associated with trends of nation building, disintegration and reconstitution in regions 
of migrants’ origin. Environmental disparities between sending and receiving territories include 
the presence or absence of resources, the relative fertility of the soil, water availability and the 
extent of forest cover. Geographical factors – not least proximity to borders and/or to a desired 
destination – also play in here. Some of these components are quantifiable, such as 
differentials in income per capita, in per capita expenditure on health and education, in the 
number of health workers per capita, the relative level of school enrolments and so on. The 
economic, political and environmental arenas might be grouped under the rubric human 
security, disparities in which predispose people to migrate. 
Proximate factors have a more direct bearing on migration and derive from the working out of 
the structural features outlined above. In countries and regions of origin, they include 
manifestations such as a downturn in the economic or business cycle, a turn for the worse in 
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the security or human rights environments generated by repression or a power struggle, large 
scale development projects that involve displacement, or marked environmental degeneration, 
including the effects of climate change. In places of destination, proximate factors might include 
opportunities that open up as a result of economic upturn or wider societal improvement, such 
as new employment opportunities, the chance to set up a business or to pursue trade, or taking 
advantage of new educational openings. There is obviously overlap with some of the elements 
of the structural domain. Again, some of these features are to some extent quantifiable – the 
economic arena probably more so than the others. This domain includes particular 
manifestations of the economic, political and environmental disparities – or collectively, of 
human security – identified above as predisposing factors. 
Precipitating factors are those that actually trigger departure. This may be the arena in which 
individual and household decisions to move or stay put are made. The precipitating factors may 
be in the economic sphere, such as financial collapse, a leap in unemployment, a factory 
closure, a collapse of farm prices, the imposition of punitive taxation, or the disintegration of 
health, education or other welfare services. Or they may be located in the political/security 
sphere, and include persecution, disputed citizenship, the escalation of conflict, massacre, 
outbreak of war, or invasion. Both arenas are again in some sense dimensions of human 
security, broadly conceived. ‘Natural’ or environmental disasters such as earthquakes, 
hurricanes or flooding also precipitate the movements of population. Again, there is a strong 
relationship with proximate factors, but unlike the previous two domains, precipitating factors 
are often not so much measurable as observable, identifiable events or developments. While 
they usually occur in places of origin they may come about in places of destination too. 
Mediating factors enable, facilitate, constrain, accelerate or consolidate migration, and 
arguably they may diminish migration too. Facilitating factors include the presence and quality 
of transport, communications, information and the resources needed for the journey and 
transit period. Constraining factors include the absence of such infrastructure and the lack of 
information and resources needed to move. The ‘migration regime’, which embraces the 
efforts of national and international organisations to manage migration, has a mediating 
function: the influence of the panoply of policies governing emigration, immigration and 
border crossing is subject to much debate. Policies and practices in other spheres – such as 
trade, education, agriculture, rural development, welfare and housing – are also likely to play 
a role here as factors enabling or constraining migration. Migrant networks encompassing 
source, transit and destination countries, and the burgeoning smuggling industry likewise 
feature here. A related factor is the ‘culture of migration’ that can arise among people and 
communities who become habituated to mobility. These components are again much less 
subject to measurement than some of the structural or proximate factors. In this domain of 
enablement and constraint, the volumes, forms and directions of migration are determined or 
shaped. If the decision to move is determined by precipitating factors, the decisions how and 
when to leave, which household members should go, and where to, are shaped by these 
mediating factors. They can be conceived as shaping the degree of risk encountered in the 
course of migration. 
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Combinations of these predisposing, proximate, precipitating and mediating ‘drivers’ shape 
the conditions, circumstances or environment within which people make choices whether to 
move or stay put, or have such decisions thrust upon them. 
Broad agreement seems to exist that sets of such factors drive migration. However, debate 
continues over what functions they have in the schema outlined above. For example, the 
migration regime, trade policies and the development of a culture of migration could well be 
proximate and/or mediating factors. Moreover, the drivers prompting people to leave a place 
may not be the same as those which help bring about their arrival at another place. Further 
configurations of drivers may come into play in more complex migration trajectories – such as 
from A to B via C and D, and so on. A different set of drivers again may animate return 
migration. It is also not clear how drivers shape the form migration takes. For example, in terms 
of distance, what determines whether migration is from one rural area to another, from the 
countryside to the city, from a town to the country’s capital, to a neighbouring country, or to 
another continent? Furthermore, how is the kind of migration determined – whether legal or 
illegal, labour, professional, student, refugee, family, marriage, and so on? 
These and other particular manifestations of migration are partly shaped by the decisions and 
actions of the people and communities affected: how they exercise their agency to ‘process 
social experience and to devise ways of coping with life, even under the most extreme forms of 
coercion’ (Long 2001: 16). The extent to which they can exert agency will reflect both their 
individual and collective capabilities (Sen 1999) and the room for manoeuvre for exercising them 
in any particular encounter (Long 2001). Such capabilities are in turn shaped by people’s social 
position in terms of gender, generation, class, ethnicity and other social cleavages. The influence 
of other actors and agents, such as national and local government officials, businesses, 
international agencies, civil society organisations and various kinds of brokers, also need to be 
worked into the analysis. Likewise, account needs to be taken of the internal dynamics of 
migration processes established by transnational social networks and the migration industry, 
which may stimulate further migration even in the absence of external drivers in areas of origin 
or destination. 
The relationship between the agency of social actors and the structural conditions in which 
they operate is subject of longstanding debate (Bakewell 2010). While acknowledging the 
importance of taking account of the agency of the many actors involved to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of migration processes, we focus primarily on the realm of 
‘external’ drivers rather than attempting to incorporate a full account of agency. 
In the two following sections attempts are made to apply our preliminary framework to two 
migration orders – within South-East Asia and between South Asia and the Middle East – as 
indicative cases. These case studies reflect the regional expertise of the RPC partners. Although 
the cases detailed below describe regional, cross-border movements, rather than internal 
migration flows, this does not mean that the drivers model proposed is only applicable in 
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regional cases. The case studies are intended to illustrate the usefulness of the drivers 
framework in general, and so do not preclude the use of the framework in the analysis of 
internal migration. 
3. Drivers of migration in South-East Asia: Indonesian domestic workers in 
Singapore and Malaysia1 
Over the past two decades, a growing proportion of migrant women have been employed as 
domestic workers within countries in the Asia-Pacific region (see Huang and Yeoh 1996; Chin 
1998; Chang and Ling 2000; Anggraeni 2006). The rising demand for such workers may be 
attributed to shifts in the occupational and class structures of highly industrialised economies, 
such as Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, that have seen a rapid expansion of middle-class 
and professional households in the light of advancing levels of education and affluence (Yeoh 
and Chang 2001; Young 2006). Along with sharp increases in female labour participation rates 
and a growing number of dual-income families, the demand for paid domestic work and other 
low-wage services has now expanded to form an integral component of these advanced 
economies. 
Here the migration of Indonesian domestic workers into Singapore and Malaysia is explored, 
with specific reference to key migration drivers that propel and sustain the in-flow of these 
workers on a variety of levels. The case highlights the interconnected relationship between the 
global economy, state policy, business practices, and individual/family aspirations that facilitate 
and reinforce this migration process as an enduring feature of these economies. In addition, 
attention is paid to the ways that these processes and practices are shaped by particular forms 
of gender, class and ethnicity that inform the type of labour typically characterised by paid 
domestic work. 
3.1 Predisposing and proximate factors: globalisation and regional economic disparities 
The flow of Indonesian domestic workers into Singapore and Malaysia can be seen as a 
structural phenomenon driven by economic and demographic disparities within the region. 
Malaysia and Singapore are the top two destination areas in South-East Asia for Indonesian 
migrants, the majority of whom are women employed as domestic workers, nannies, and 
elderly care workers (IOM 2010b). Qualitative studies have shown that the main driving 
factors behind this type of migration are often economic (Ford 2001; Human Rights Watch 
2005; Anggraeni 2006; IOM 2010b). Pay differentials provide a strong incentive for these 
women to migrate abroad in order to improve their livelihoods and social status. 
As illustrated in Table 1, the proportion of Indonesia’s GDP per capita in 2008 constituted 
only 27.4 and six per cent of the figure in Malaysia and Singapore respectively. High levels of 
1 This section is based on a briefing prepared by Grace H.Y. Baey of the Asia Research Institute, National University 
of Singapore. ARI is a core partner within the RPC. 
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unemployment and underemployment in Indonesia also make it difficult for individuals (and 
particularly women) to seek job opportunities locally. 
Table 1: Economic Indicators for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore 
Indicator Year Indonesia Malaysia Singapore 
Population (millions) 2010 232.5 27.9 4.8 
GDP per capita (USD) 2008 2,246 8,209 37,597 
Unemployment rate (% of labour force) 2009 7.7 5.0 3.0 
Female population with at least 
secondary education (% ages 25 
and older) 
2010 24.2 46.7 57.3 
Human Poverty Index (HPI) rank 2007 69 25 14  
Sources: Adapted and compiled from ILO (2010); UNDP Human Development Report 
2010, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete.pdf; and 
the United Nations Statistics Division, available at http://data.un.org 
Malaysia has experienced significant labour shortages in the low-wage sector since the late 
1970s, owing to its state-led industrialisation programme – namely, the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) between 1971 and 1990, and the National Development Policy (NDP) between 1991 
and 2000 – which sought to diversify the nation’s economy through export promotion and 
the establishment of an educated workforce (Chin 2002; Kaur 2010). Likewise, economic 
restructuring in Singapore since the late 1970s has steadily attracted large numbers of 
migrant workers to predominantly low-skilled jobs in the construction, manufacturing, and 
waged domestic sectors increasingly shunned by locals (Wong 1997; Yeoh 2007). 
In these destination areas, rapid industrialisation and an increase in women’s participation in 
the workforce resulted in a steady rise in the number of dual-income families, which was 
accompanied by a strong demand for migrant domestic workers who served as paid substitutes 
for the social reproductive labour needed within these middle-class households (Huang and 
Yeoh 1996). In Singapore, for example, the current labour force participation rate among 
women aged 30-34 is 80.5 per cent (as of June 2008), which marks a substantial rise from the 
1998 figure of 68.2 per cent (MOM 2009). It is estimated that Indonesian women constitute the 
majority (55 per cent) of the 196,000 migrant domestic workers in Singapore where one in every 
five households employs a live-in domestic worker (MOM 2010, cited in IOM 2010b: 54). This 
dependency is also apparent in Malaysia where a recent ban on new arrivals of Indonesian 
domestic workers (in June 2009) following a series of cases of abuse has triggered a domestic 
crisis where almost 35,000 households are said to be left without a helper (Beh 2011). In view of 
the acute dependency on migrant domestic labour in both Singapore and Malaysia, the 
consumption of waged domestic labour in middle-class households plays an integral role in 
enabling the sustained levels of economic growth characterised by these destination countries 
(Huang and Yeoh 1996; Chin 1998; Aguilar 2003). 
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In response to the demand for domestic labour, the Indonesian government has increasingly 
promoted overseas labour migration as a development strategy to address issues of poverty, 
domestic unemployment and underemployment, as well as to encourage foreign direct 
investment through remittances (see Table 2). According to the Bank of Indonesia (2008, cited in 
IOM 2010b), remittances to Indonesia reached approximately US$6.6 billion in 2008, which 
represents 0.7 per cent of its annual GDP. The majority of workers migrate with the intention of 
working abroad for a limited period of time in order to finance their children or siblings in 
school, or to save enough money for a house purchase or business venture (IOM 2010b). This 
pattern of migration stems from strict policies enforced by the Singapore and Malaysian 
governments which prohibit permanent settlement. An IOM (2010b) study has revealed, 
however, that it is not uncommon for migrants to be re-contracted overseas once their finances 
have been depleted, which feeds in turn into a self-perpetuating migration cycle. 
Table 2: Number of Indonesian Migrant Workers Abroad, 1969 to 1994 
State Development Programme Period Number of Migrants 
1st Five-Year Development Plan2 1969 to 1974 5,624 
2nd Five-Year Development Plan 1974 to 1979 17,042 
3rd Five-Year Development Plan 1979 to 1984 96,410 
4th Five-Year Development Plan 1984 to 1989 292,262 
5th Five-Year Development Plan 1989 to 1994 652,272  
Source: Department of Manpower, Directorate General of Overseas Labour (1994, cited in 
Sukamdi et al. 2001: 95) 
3.2 Mediating factors: state policies and the emergence of a domestic worker recruitment 
industry 
Since the 1980s, the Singapore and Malaysian governments have taken steps to regulate the 
labour market for migrant domestic workers in recognition of the growing need for paid domestic 
services within these countries (Wong 1996; Chin 2002). Policies have included measures 
ensuring stricter control of labour recruitment activities, and higher penalties imposed to deter 
illegal immigration and rogue employment practices. In Singapore, for example, the newly 
amended Employment Agency Act stipulates that agencies may be fined up to S$160,000 
(US$124,550) together with up to four years of imprisonment for operating without a license 
(MOM 2011). Furthermore, employment agencies are required to refund 50 per cent of the 
agency fees paid for by domestic workers, in the event that their work contracts have been 
prematurely terminated by their employers within six months of commencement. At the same 
time, parameters have also been drawn up by the Indonesian government to enhance the 
protection and labour conditions of migrants working abroad. 
2 The ‘Five Years Development Plan’ (PELITA) is a short-term national development programme outlined by the 
Indonesian government based on certain aims, priorities, and targets. 
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The role of both sending and receiving states in regulating cross-border flows of migrant 
domestic workers between Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia has been crucial to the 
emergence of an extensive domestic worker recruitment industry within the region (Chin 2002; 
Low 2002; Yeoh 2004; Kaur 2007). As a result, labour recruitment for the domestic sector is 
almost entirely commercialised and managed by official recruitment agencies, along with a 
range of other intermediaries including private entrepreneurs (both licensed and unlicensed), 
labour contractors, and village brokers who deal in matters such as documentation procedures, 
transportation, training, and accommodation (Wong 1996; Kaur 2007). These networks have 
helped to reduce the costs and risks of migration for prospective workers through their various 
forms of assistance, although the multiple layers and fees involved make it easy for 
unauthorised migration to occur as well. Due to Indonesia’s vast geographic span, weak 
economy, and limited access to education, trafficking and smuggling have remained a 
persistent problem particularly with respect to Malaysia (IOM 2010b). 
Malaysia continues to receive the highest annual number of Indonesian domestic workers within 
the region due to its geographical proximity and ethnic and linguistic similarities (IOM 2010b). 
These connections allow easier communication between employers and Indonesian domestic 
workers, as well as facilitate the incorporation of these workers into the socio-cultural fabric of 
society such that they tend to remain ‘hidden’ from view. According to the Malaysian Home 
Affairs Ministry, approximately 230,000 of the 240,000 migrant domestic workers in Malaysia 
with recognised legal status are from Indonesia (cited in Orozco and Fedewa 2005: 8). It is also 
estimated that there are over 1.2 million undocumented workers in Malaysia, a significant 
proportion of whom are migrant domestic workers from Indonesia (Hernández-Coss et al. 2008). 
In the case of Singapore, Indonesian domestic workers are often a preferred option by employers 
due to their relatively low cost and perceived docility compared to their Filipino counterparts. It is 
a widely accepted ‘norm’ among employers that engaging the services of an Indonesian domestic 
worker implies that they are not legally obliged to provide any days off for the worker (Yeoh and 
Huang 1998). While Filipino domestic workers are entitled to a higher pay scale (roughly 30 per 
cent) and weekly day off, Indonesian workers are offered poorer terms of employment as they 
are generally perceived to be less skilled and less educated. 
The aspirations of migrant domestic workers and their families that motivate the initial decision 
to migrate may be entirely different from what is expected of them at the workplace (Young 
2006). While Indonesian women choose to migrate in hope of improving their economic 
situation, indebtedness and lack of education often make them vulnerable to exploitation and 
abuse (Huang and Yeoh 1996; Human Rights Watch 2005; Anggaeni 2006; HOME and TWC2 
2010). Furthermore, the gendered and racialised nature of paid domestic work—exemplified 
through the unequal transfer of social reproductive labour to ‘Third World’ women in middle-
class households (see Chin 1998; Pratt 1998; Chang and Ling 2000)—frequently translates into 
the systematic disempowerment of these women in terms of wages and working conditions. In 
Singapore, moreover, violence against Indonesian domestic workers appears to have increased 
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between 2005 and 2008 (Institute for Ecosoc Rights survey forthcoming 2010, cited in IOM 
2010b). 
3.3 Conclusion: identifying drivers 
This case has identified the principal drivers of migration and shown how they operate on a 
variety of scales. On a macro-level, economic and demographic disparities stemming from the 
uneven processes of globalisation and demographic transition represent predisposing factors that 
underpin the sustained inflow of migrant domestic workers from Indonesia into Singapore and 
Malaysia. High levels of unemployment and underemployment in Indonesia are among the 
proximate factors that push many women to migrate into Singapore and Malaysia where higher 
wages are offered, and where growing demand for migrant domestic labour has become 
embedded in their labour markets. The encouragement of Indonesian out-migration to secure 
remittances and geographical proximity of migrant source and destination countries constitute 
other key proximate drivers inducing migration between the countries. 
These migration flows are facilitated by state policies, in both sending and receiving countries, 
which play a mediating role in determining the proportion and type of migrant labour needed to 
meet specific labour demands within the market. At the same time, the regulatory and legal 
frameworks that are the manifestations of such policies reinforce the establishment of a 
regional domestic worker recruitment industry through which prospective workers are sourced, 
recruited, and trained. Cultural factors lubricate the migration and the industry associated with 
it. These practices occur within a web of power relations in which Indonesian women remain 
susceptible to the risks of deception, abuse, and exploitation at both ends of the migration 
chain. On an individual/family level, Indonesian women engage in labour migration often as part 
of family survival strategies and as a way of seeking upward mobility. However, the fact that 
paid domestic work in Singapore and Malaysia is overwhelmingly undertaken by young migrant 
women from economically less-developed countries like Indonesia implies that the factors 
driving this pattern of migration are not solely economic, but also deeply embedded within 
social hierarchies of gender, class, ethnicity, and age. 
4. Migration from Bangladesh to the Gulf3 
The number of officially recorded Bangladeshi international labour migrants increased from 
around 300,000 in 2005 to 900,000 in 2008. Between five and seven million Bangladeshis are 
currently thought to work abroad. Of these about two-fifths are thought to have worked in Gulf 
states between 1976 and 2009, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE accounting for most (Gamlen 
2010). The majority of migrants are unskilled with relatively low levels of formal education, and 
tend to work in agriculture, construction and domestic services. A study commissioned by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) suggests that 60 per cent of male Bangladeshi migrants 
move to Saudi Arabia, while some 40 per cent of Bangladeshi female 
3 This section is based on a briefing prepared by Jodi Rockman for RMMRU, Dhaka. RMMRU is a core partner within 
the RPC. 
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migrants travel to Kuwait (Plant 2008). The UAE is a third key destination for Bangladeshi Gulf 
migrants. 
4.1 Predisposing factors: income disparities, demography, environment 
The most significant driver of Bangladeshi migration to the Gulf states is economic inequality. 
There are stark differences between Bangladesh and Gulf countries in income levels, 
employment levels and standards of living. Bangladesh ranked 146 out of 182 countries on the 
Human Development Index and 112 out of 135 countries on the Human Poverty Index (UNDP 
2009). Nearly 50 per cent of its population was said to subsist on less than US$1.25 per day and 
four-fifths on less than US$2 a day (UNDP 2009). 
In contrast, the economies and living standards of the oil rich Gulf have grown rapidly over the 
past four decades. The great expansion of infrastructure projects following the 1973 ‘oil boom’ 
led to a rapid increase in the demand for foreign labour, since GCC national workforces at that 
time were too small to meet demand (Winkler 2010: 10). 
Bangladesh’s demographic and environmental profiles also predispose Bangladeshis to migrate. 
Since independence, significant progress has been made in ameliorating Bangladesh population 
growth, which has fallen to 1.5 per cent per annum, half the 1971 level. The World Bank also 
calculates that poverty rates have fallen from 70 per cent in 1971 to 40 per cent in 2005. 
Nevertheless, Bangladesh remains one of the most densely populated states in the world, again 
contributing to difficulty in securing sustainable livelihoods for all its citizens, particularly those 
dependent on accessing land (World Bank 2007). Accelerated economic growth coupled with 
continued demographic overcrowding may predispose Bangladeshis to migrate. Much of the 
country lies within a densely peopled, flood-prone delta. River bank erosion, floods, cyclones, 
rising sea levels and drought have all been identified as factors driving Bangladeshis to move 
because of the difficulty of securing access to a sustainable livelihood under such conditions. 
4.2 Proximate factors: livelihoods, culture 
Bangladeshis who migrate to the Gulf do so to improve their standard of living, for income 
maximisation and accumulation of wealth for future investment in Bangladesh (Siddiqui 2001). 
For a large number of rural households remittances are a major source of earning to maintain 
subsistence, with empirical studies revealing that remittances constituted half of the total 
income of these rural households (Siddiqui and Abrar 2003). Bangladeshi migrants use 
remittances to pay off debts, or invest earnings in physical capital back home, including land 
and houses. They are also used to buy consumer items, such as televisions and mobile phones. 
Such assets partly serve as status symbols, accumulation of which plays into the marriage and 
dowry system. Migration by men from rural Bangladesh is driven by the prospects of upward 
economic and social mobility. 
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Environmental factors also create conditions making migration more likely and may interact 
with other drivers to create new patterns of migration. Siddiqui’s study (2001) on female 
migrant workers from Bangladesh detailed a number of instances in which families from 
Manikgang and Nabangang lost agricultural land due to riverbank erosion, and as a result 
needed alternative means to maintain their livelihood. The availability of female employment 
contracts in the Gulf means that women migrate to provide their families with a much needed 
income, which could not be provided from the land. This is despite the cultural expectation that 
men should act as the main breadwinners. Climate change is likely to exacerbate existing 
environmental issues through the increasing frequency of sudden-onset events, such as 
hurricanes and floods, as well as slow onset processes, such as coastal erosion, sea-level rise, 
salt water intrusion and changing rainfall patterns (IOM 2010a). 
Cultural expectations also play a proximate role in encouraging migration. Research by the 
Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (DRC 2009) 
demonstrates the importance of the husband’s role as breadwinner in Bangladeshi villages, 
and that men’s migration for work was often conceptualised as part of them fulfilling their 
obligation to provide for their families. Migration from Bangladesh to countries in the Gulf 
region in particular, also made more likely by the cultural and religious affinity between the 
areas. The population of Bangladesh is predominantly Muslim and so are those from Gulf 
countries. The opportunity to visit Mecca in Saudi Arabia is a factor which facilitates 
migration to the region. In Afsar’s (2009: 26) study on migration from Bangladesh to the Gulf, 
many men attached religious value to going to Saudi Arabia and accepted jobs there as they 
considered the move a rare opportunity to visit the holy city. The ILO estimated that 15 per 
cent of Bangladeshi male migrants in Saudi Arabia had travelled using an Umra visa, which 
are offered free of charge to pilgrims completing Hajj, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, and 
are relatively easy to obtain (Plant 2008). 
4.3 Precipitating factors: economic shocks, family disputes, networks 
Personal events are often those most likely to precipitate migration. Afsar (2009: 12) cites 
illness, death of a breadwinner, business losses and poor crop yield as factors contributing to 
a loss in income and subsequently to the increase in migration. Economic hardship, which has 
lead to debt and the consequent inability to break free from this debt, was cited by Afsar 
(2009) as a migration trigger. Her study of 60 Bangladeshi labour migrants living in the Gulf 
shows how respondents were being driven to migrate when they saw no other avenues to 
eradicate their debt. 
Family and social issues experienced by Bangladeshis have been identified as factors 
instigating the decision to migrate to the Gulf, particularly for female workers. In Siddiqui’s 
(2001) work on female migrants from Bangladesh, migration was often cited as offering a 
temporary escape from an unhappy marriage or domestic violence in a culture in which 
divorce is not an option. In addition, for unmarried and widowed women migration offered a 
means to avoid social stigma. 
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The Bangladeshi diaspora and returned migrants’ ‘success stories’ are both major ‘pull’ factors 
and departure triggers. Existing networks in the Gulf act as a precipitating migration factor. 
Referring to statistics from the Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training database, 
Siddiqui (2001) points out that around two-thirds of recruitment is now conducted through 
individual initiatives and social networks. As Bangladeshis have a strong tradition of migration to 
Gulf countries, family members and friends in these destination countries provide social capital 
for future Bangladeshis to join their network. Afsar’s (2009) study of labour migration to the Gulf 
found that an overwhelming majority of respondents – more than 90 per cent men and 80 per 
cent women – already had one or more relatives abroad. 
4.4 Mediating factors: recruitment agents, cost of migration, policy regimes 
In Bangladesh, private recruitment agencies, individual recruiters, sub-agents of registered 
recruitment agencies and travel agencies are important in encouraging and shaping the 
nature of migration flows. Middlemen are often engaged in a process of visiting households, 
persuading families to invest in the migration of female household members rather than 
marrying them off and paying large dowries (Siddiqui and Abrar 2002; Siddiqui 2001). 
Most Bangladeshi recruitment agencies work with brokers in destination countries. At the same 
time, private recruitment agencies also work with local sub-agents, known locally as Dalals, who 
find and refer prospective migrants from villages and areas far from city centres (Afsar 2009). 
Concerns have been raised that many recruiting agencies exploit prospective migrants, charging 
high fees and failing to guarantee basic standards of employment (Plant 2008). 
The different costs associated with migration to the Gulf also shape or mediate the nature of 
Bangladeshi labour migration. A recent IOM survey showed that 14 per cent of migrants decided 
to migrate to their current destination because it was too expensive to migrate to any other 
country (IOM 2009: 35). Other studies have suggested that for Bangladeshi migrants, UAE 
emerges on average as the most costly destination, followed by Kuwait. Gender also influences 
cost: the average cost of migration for men has been estimated to be around US$1,400-2000, 
but for women the cost was only around half this amount (Plant 2008; Afsar 2009). 
Other studies have highlighted the fact that the high cost of migration in general, and limited 
options to finance short-term movement abroad, can act as a constraints for poor community 
members who desire to migrate to the Gulf states but are unable to cover the average costs to 
facilitate a move (Afsar, 2009). The pervasive practice of visa trading in destination countries 
and the inability of many aspirant migrants to directly procure recruitment agency services 
means that Bangladeshis accept a high level of risk and will move irregularly outside the formal 
migration framework in order to secure short-term overseas employment in the Gulf states. 
Being able to mobilise resources to fund migration is therefore a key migration determinant. 
Access to loans and family members who can assist with funds and savings is key to migration 
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once the decision to move abroad has been made. In the Bangladesh Household Remittance 
Survey (IOM 2009), 67 per cent of respondents took a loan to cover partial or full costs of 
their migration. Money from family members was the next most common source (41 per 
cent), followed by selling of land (24 per cent), mortgaging of land (23 per cent) and selling of 
other assets (20 per cent). The most marginalised Bangladeshis are therefore unable to 
access migration channels because they do not hold sufficient financial capital. 
The migration regime of both Bangladesh and those of Gulf countries shape and drive migration 
on various levels. In Bangladesh, the Ministry of Expatriate Welfare and Overseas Employment 
has been established to deal specifically with the protection challenges migrant workers face. In 
2006 the Overseas Employment Policy was adopted, identifying principles for the protection of 
migrant workers abroad, and expressing a commitment to take legal action against illegal 
recruiters. In the same year the Bangladesh Agency for Manpower, Employment and Training 
and the main labour recruitment agency jointly agreed to enforce limits on recruitment fees. In 
these ways, the Bangladeshi state has sought to intervene in order to provide migrants with 
additional protection against exploitation (Plant 2008). 
Migration policy has also shaped the gender profile of migrant flows from Bangladesh. In 2003, 
women were granted the right to migrate as independent workers, when the Government of 
Bangladesh changed its policy to allow women to migrate to the Gulf upon receiving training. 
Prior to the legislation reform, unskilled female migrants contributed to less than one per cent of 
all outgoing Bangladeshi labour migrants. By 2006, this figure had risen to almost six per cent 
(Siddiqui, personal communication 2011). 
The various migration regimes of Gulf states have also shaped migration flows from 
Bangladesh. Female migrants tend to select Kuwait as their destination because its labour 
laws are seen as more favourable than those in other Gulf countries. 
4.5 Conclusion: identifying drivers 
In the case of movement from Bangladesh to the Gulf, socio-economic structural disparities and 
environmental stress have created a setting in which many Bangladeshis are predisposed to 
engage in short-term labour migration. Migration to the Gulf is made more likely by cultural 
expectations regarding livelihood provision, and the impact of environmental damage upon 
family livelihood strategies. The cultural and religious affinity between Bangladesh and the Gulf 
states is also an important factor which shapes the nature of Bangladeshi labour migration. 
Precipitating factors which cause potential Bangladeshi migrants to actually depart for Gulf 
countries have several dimensions. Socially, access to networks both in Bangladesh and in 
Gulf countries plays an important role. Economic factors such as sudden financial shock 
commonly trigger migration. On an individual level, family disputes, deaths, violence or 
marital conflict can precipitate movement. 
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A number of factors mediate, or shape, migration from Bangladesh to the Gulf, among them 
mobilising resources to fund migration. Gulf states’ interest in short-term temporary or circular 
labour migration shapes the nature of Bangladeshi movement to the region. The Bangladeshi 
state’s restrictions – and recent liberalisation – regarding its out-migration policies (including 
restrictions on unskilled female out-migration) have also helped shape Bangladeshi migration, 
particularly in terms of encouraging an expansion in the numbers of regularised female 
Bangladeshi migrants to the Gulf. 
5. Refining the framework 
Having attempted application of our preliminary framework to two regional or inter-regional 
migration systems, we next attempt to refine our understanding of drivers by looking at some 
of their dimensions and the ways in which they may be configured in what we call driver 
complexes. 
5. 1 Differentiating drivers: dimensions of drivers 
We may think of a driver as arising from or being associated with a particular domain of the 
social world, such as culture, geography, politics, economy, history, environment or 
demography. However, this does not get us very far in our analysis: distinguishing between a 
historical, political or geographic driver does not tell us much about what the driver does or 
how it operates. We rather aim to tease out a number of dimensions which can be used to 
characterise drivers of migration and tell us something about how they work. As well as their 
function in the migration process as outlined above – predisposing, proximate, precipitating, 
or mediating – these dimensions include locality, scale, duration and depth or tractability. 
5.1.1 Locality 
Some drivers might be associated more strongly with the area of origin, such as demographic or 
environmental pressures. Others are more centred around the area of destination, such as 
immigration policies. Still others may help to shape the journey, such as geographical proximity. 
We also need to consider those drivers which operate transnationally or translocally, such as 
transnational labour markets, which might involve agents in the origin area recruiting to meet 
labour demands in destination countries. 
5.1.2 Scale 
Drivers operate at different geographical scales, from the local, national and regional to the 
global. A famine may force people to consider moving over a whole region; in contrast, the 
closing or opening of a large factory may change migration patterns from or to a particular 
town. Drivers may also operate at different social scales, from the individual, household or 
family to the community and wider society. Here, we may also need to explore the scale of 
drivers’ coverage of a range of social groups. A driver may have a different impact on various 
social groups, defined by gender, generation, class, language, ethnicity, religion and so forth. 
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For example, the establishment of a new university may draw in new migrants over a wide 
area for education, but we would expect the migrants involved to be mainly young adults. 
5.1.3 Timeframe/duration 
Drivers operate over different time frames. For example, an acute political crisis may force 
people to leave their homes very quickly and take refuge elsewhere, as has been the case 
recently in Libya, or a chronic crisis such as that seen in recent years in Zimbabwe may result in 
an ongoing exodus of people over a long period. Is important to note that here we are 
concerned with the timeframe of the driver, not that of the migration. A short-term driver, such 
as violent conflict, may result in long-term or permanent migration and, likewise, a long-term 
driver may result in periodic movements back and forth rather than long-term migration. 
5.1.4 Depth or tractability 
Here we try to distinguish between drivers that operate on the surface of the society, which may 
be liable to change readily with contextual shifts, and those that are more deeply embedded and 
intractable. For example, if spending time away from one’s community comes to be seen as an 
essential step on the way to adulthood – such as Mandela’s claims of the South Africa labour 
migration system in the 1930s: ‘in those days working in the mines was as much a rite of passage 
as circumcision school’ (1994: 31) – the cultural driver for migration can be seen as deeply 
embedded. Some economic drivers may be less embedded and more responsive to changes in 
policies, such as visa requirements or employment restrictions, which make migration more 
expensive and less rewarding. 
6. Understanding driver complexes 
Having characterised drivers in terms of their functions and having explored some of the 
dimensions along which they operate, we now turn to ways in which drivers may combine to 
form different complexes or configurations which shape migration processes. 
As we have indicated, particular migration drivers may predispose a population to move. 
However, they do not work in isolation to precipitate people’s movement or to shape it once 
under way. Instead, migration drivers work in combination – in what can be termed driver 
complexes – to shape the specific form and structure of population movements. In any one 
migration flow, several different ‘driver complexes’ may themselves interconnect in shaping 
the eventual direction and nature of a group's movement. 
In what follows we consider two migration corridors involving combinations of drivers – that 
connecting Afghanistan with Iran and Pakistan and that connecting the Somali regions to 
southern Africa -- to identify in schematic fashion three sets of driver complexes operating at the 
place of origin, on the journey and in the destination area. These two cases were selected 
because they have a rich and particularly complex history, connecting political insecurity, 
economic inequalities and cultural and social expectations. Both cases include ‘forced’ migrants 
as well as ‘economic’ migrants, and both movements have been subject to direct policy 
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interventions intended to influence the direction and duration of their movement. As a result, 
while neither the Afghan or Somali cases can be held to be ‘typical’ of migration flows, they were 
felt to be particularly useful contexts through which to illustrate the inter-connectedness of 
migration drivers. 
6.1 The Afghan-Iran/Pakistan corridor4 
6.1.1 Driver complex one: outward migration and the political economy of conflict 
Afghan out-migration to Iran and Pakistan long predates the onset of civil war and the collapse of 
the Afghan state that followed the overthrow of the Afghan monarchy in 1973 (Monsutti 2006). If 
we are to understand the driver complexes propelling outward migration from contemporary 
Afghanistan, we must first recognise that as a result of four decades of political insecurity the 
Afghan migration complex has shifted from being one of fluid, continuous and multi-directional 
movement motivated above all by cultural and economic interdependency. 
Since the 1970s, there have been at least three distinct waves of forced migration from 
Afghanistan towards Pakistan and Iran. The Afghan refugee population peaked in 1990 at 6.22 
million, a number which represented around 40 per cent of the entire Afghan population. Despite 
huge repatriation efforts following the American-led invasion of Afghanistan and the removal of 
the Taliban from power in 2002, there remain around three million Afghan registered refugees, 
2.14 million residing in Pakistan and 910 000 in Iran. These remaining refugees are long-term 
exiles, who have significant links with Iran and Pakistan. By the end of 2008, 77 per cent of 
Afghans in Pakistan had resided there for 30 years, while half the Afghan population in Iran had 
been resident there for 20 years (UNHCR 2008: 3). This development of a refugee diaspora is 
important to underline because, in conjunction with labour migration policy changes in Pakistan 
and particularly in Iran, the duration of the crisis in Afghanistan has changed the shape of Afghan 
migration, away from repeated and fluid transborder movement and towards permanent (and 
often irregular) settlement. 
Since 2005, a political economy of crisis resulting from the retreat of the weak Afghan state and 
increased militarisation in regions such as Helmand and Kandahar has driven a new wave of 
displacement. However, militarisation of these areas has above all resulted in growing numbers 
of conflict-induced internally displaced persons (IDPs) and massive rural-to-urban flows towards 
Kabul. The International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that in March 2010 
there were around 240,000 conflict-induced IDPs (including around 80,000 displaced prior to 
2002) (IDMC 2010). In contrast, there has not been a mass refugee influx into Pakistan or Iran, 
where attention has instead focused on facilitating mass refugee repatriation. 
The key to understanding contemporary Afghan out-migration to Iran and Pakistan lies in 
connecting this refugee repatriation to the continuing failure of the Afghan state to foster a 
functioning and secure society. This has resulted in new flows or re-migrations which are not 
4 This section was prepared by Katy Long of the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford. 
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primarily precipitated by the direct impact of conflict and militarisation, but by poor prospects for 
refugee reintegration. These are primarily perceived and acted upon in economic terms, 
although lack of access to sustainable livelihoods within Afghanistan is of course connected to 
the political weakness of the Afghan state and its inability to secure political or social space free 
from corruption and clientelism (UNODC 2010). 
Afghan labour migration was viewed as an almost inevitable reaction to endemic state fragility 
and chronic economic underdevelopment resulting from decades of conflict and state 
militarisation. As UNHCR recognised in 2003, '...many of the reasons why Afghan [refugees] left 
their homes no longer apply... Economic factors have played an increasingly influential role in 
cross border movements and in sustaining the Afghan presence abroad' (UNHCR 2003: 3). These 
structural weaknesses were further exacerbated by rapid Afghan population growth. The rapid 
return of four million Afghan refugees from 2002 placed even greater pressure on Afghan’s 
limited economic infrastructure. The deteriorating security situation from 2006 certainly 
exacerbated Afghan’s critical lack of economic or political stability, intensified their physical 
insecurity (particularly in the south of the country), and prevented the successful ‘early recovery’ 
that had been anticipated after 2002. However, it is above all the political economy of Afghan 
impoverishment which – in combination with cultural and historical factors – is driving current 
migration flows out of Afghanistan towards Pakistan and Iraq. 
The cultural and historical dimensions of the Afghan outmigration ‘driver complex’ relate both to 
Afghanistan’s pre-crisis history and experiences of movement during the conflict. As highlighted, 
regional mobility and seasonal transnational migration patterns existed prior to the creation of 
an Afghan state, which imposed artificial and largely meaningless borders (Monsutti 2008). 
Livelihood strategies would often involve family dispersal, with male labourers travelling through 
the region in order to support a household within a settled Afghan community. These pre-
existing labour networks and cultural familiarity with migration as an effective livelihood strategy 
have thus been co-opted into current outflows caused by the lack of a functioning Afghan 
economy and resulting human insecurity. Personal ‘lived experience’ of displacement in Pakistan 
and Iran also means that these areas and regions may often be viewed as at least as plausible a 
‘home’ as Afghanistan for many returnees who were born in exile or left as children. 
6.1.2 Driver complex two: the political economy of opportunity 
As indicated above, contemporary migration outflows from Afghanistan towards Iran and 
Pakistan – at least at a broad macro-level – are not driven directly by physical insecurity (unlike 
IDP flight), but by the political economy of conflict and the failure of post-2002 reconstruction. 
They are facilitated by a cultural and historical legacy that encourages such out-migration 
responses to be viewed as an effective and readily accessible coping mechanism in light of the 
incapacity of the Afghan state to provide sustainable human security. Afghan migrants’ reasons 
for choosing to move towards Iran and Pakistan are arguably easier to comprehend, and are 
closely tied to a political economy of opportunity. 
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The Afghan economy is far weaker and far less able to offer Afghan citizens access to sustainable 
livelihoods than the far more developed Iranian and (to a lesser extent) Pakistani economies. 
GDP (PPP) per head in the three countries reflects this economic disparity: Afghanistan's GDP 
(PPP) per head is US$934, in contrast to the Pakistani figure of US$2,683 and Iran with 
US$10,939 (World Bank 2010). Afghans migrate to Iran and Pakistan because their economies 
are larger and perceived to offer far greater opportunity to secure livelihoods, both for those 
actually migrating and their dependants who remain in Afghanistan. Both the Iranian and 
Pakistani economies are also structurally dependent on cheap migrant labour.5 
Furthermore, the long exile of the Afghan diaspora has resulted in certain economic 
activities – such as taxi driving in Quetta – becoming the preserve of the Afghan migrant 
population. The specific contributions of some local skilled workers – notably Turkmen 
carpet weavers in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North West Frontier Province) – 
have also been recognised as making a valuable economic contribution to Pakistan. This has 
created particular spaces within the state's economy that are particularly dependent on 
Afghan labour, strengthening the political economy of opportunity offered to Afghans in 
Pakistan and Iran (AREU 2006). 
Cultural ties, geographical proximity and socio-economic status also influence the choice of Iran 
and Pakistan as destination countries. Close cultural ties reflect economic interdependencies 
between the Pashtun communities that straddle the Afghan-Pakistan border. Similarly, the 
Tajiks (Persian-speaking Afghans in Herat Province) and the Hazara (a Shiite minority residing in 
central and northern Afghanistan) have particular ties to Iran. These ethnic and cultural ties are 
reflected in the profiles of the Afghan communities in Iran and Pakistan (ICG 2009). 
The close proximity of both Quetta and Peshawar – key urban centres with large economies – to 
the Pakistan-Afghan borders, and the existence of roads linking these cities to the nearby Afghan 
cities of Kandahar and Kabul respectively provide an obvious explanation for the particular 
dynamics of these migration flows. This is true both in terms of earlier conflict-induced flight 
(when these routes offered the fastest pathway to physical security) and current movements in 
search of economic security (when ease of cross border-movement and the ability to make 
return visits to family remaining in Afghanistan are often an important dimension of migrants' 
strategic planning). Similarly, Afghans in Iran are concentrated in Mashhad and Zahedan, the two 
cities closest to the Afghan border, as well as in Tehran (Abbasi-Shavasi et al. 2005) 
It is important to note, however, that this perception of a political economy of opportunity in 
Pakistan and Iran is relative to Afghans socio-economic status. There is a global Afghan 
diaspora, with significant resident populations in the US, Canada and the EU, often holding 
dual citizenship. This global diaspora reflects the economic stratification within the diaspora 
and the ability of the wealthiest migrants to travel out of the region and towards greater 
opportunities in other political settings (Van Hear 2006). 
5 This migration is not just from Afghanistan, but also involves considerable intra-state migration flows. 
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The populations that continue to travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan are not the poorest within 
Afghan society and have some access to capital. However they should be broadly categorised as 
labourers rather than middle-class or elite Afghans. It should be noted, however, that those elite 
Afghan families that spent time and often own property or hold business interests in Pakistan 
are also swayed by the lack of economic security within Afghanistan, and the economic 
opportunities available elsewhere.6 These flows are not restricted to Iran and Pakistan: there are 
considerable numbers of elite Afghans resident in the UAE and other Gulf states as well as in 
North America and Europe (Jazayery 2002). 
When exploring the driver complex propelling Afghan migration to Iran and Pakistan, it is 
important to underline that – in contrast with the driver complex drawing Somalis to southern 
Africa, considered below – neither Iran nor Pakistan offer the opportunity to practice a ‘politics 
of freedom’. Iran is a restrictive theocracy which asserts a strong rule of law but understands 
this role as in direct opposition to liberal values. In Pakistan, endemic corruption coupled with 
the growing power of the Taliban and related Islamist forces – particularly in the north-west of 
the state where Afghan migrant flows are concentrated – mean that Afghan interests in 
accessing a political economy of opportunity should not be confused with either the ability to or 
an interest in securing liberal freedoms through migration. 
Two million Pakistanis have now become internally displaced as a result of instability and 
continuing conflict in the north-west. This humanitarian disaster was exacerbated by the massive 
2010 floods in the region (ICG 2010). There is some evidence that this has resulted in escalating 
hostility towards Afghan populations in the region, both because of increased competition for 
resources and the association of Afghans with the Taliban.7 These changing political 
circumstances – economic deterioration and decreased cultural hospitality -- may result in the 
breakdown of the ‘political economy of opportunity’ perceived to exist in Pakistan by Afghan 
labourers, resulting in new driver complexes that shift these migration flows elsewhere. 
6.1.3 Driver complex three: shaping the journey and the Afghan presence abroad 
In the past ten years, Afghan movement from Afghanistan to Iran and Pakistan has broadly 
shifted away from forced refugee flight, responding instead to primarily economic insecurity. 
The nature of this journey has been shaped by a number of factors, including culture and 
geography. Above all, however, it is international and state-driven policy responses, aimed at 
both facilitating refugee return and regulating Afghan migration, that have made Afghan 
migrants' journeys to Iran and Pakistan into overwhelmingly irregular, clandestine and risky 
journeys. 
6 Another group of Afghans moving between Afghanistan and Pakistan are, of course, Taliban and Al-Qaeda 
operatives engaged in military operations against the Afghan state and NATO forces. However, this group’s reasons 
for movement are qualitatively different from those of Afghan labour migrants, and are therefore excluded from 
this analysis. 
7 UNHCR sources, June 2010. 
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The impact of culture and geography on routes into Iran and Pakistan are fairly straightforward. 
Kin networks and tribal links facilitate the development of informal migrant networks and 
smuggling routes, strengthened by the long history of people-smuggling over these borders 
during periods of refugee exodus. Similarly, the close geographical proximity of cities such as 
Kabul and Peshawar makes the planning of journeys to Pakistan relatively simple. The route 
between Kabul and the Pakistani Torkham border, as a result of a newly US-built road, now takes 
just three and a half hours and taxi drivers regularly cover the route. While border corruption and 
the risk of kidnapping or robbery on the route means that this journey can hardly be considered 
‘secure’, it is relatively straightforward. 
More problematic, however, is the insistence of both the Iranian and Pakistani governments on 
linking refugee repatriation with permanent removal of Afghan populations from their territory, 
marked by increasing restriction on Afghan access to labour markets, even by registered refugee 
populations. In both Iran and Pakistan, the governments have remained focused on the idea of 
return, insisting that 'displacement is reversible, and that all Afghans should/will return to 
Afghanistan' (UNHCR 2008: 17). 
Some strategies pursued to encourage refugee return have acknowledged the connection 
between labour migration and repatriation – for example, in Iran's promotion of one labour-
permit scheme whereby registered Afghans refugee could quality for a work and residence 
permit (renewable for up to three years) if they first took their families ‘home’ to Afghanistan 
(UNHCR 2008: 20).8 Other Iranian programmes have offered work and residency permits in 
return for Afghan refugees' surrendering their Amayesh card (refugee identity document). 
However, many observers see the Iranian government's actions as a covert means of increasing 
the rate of return. The US$70 cost of the Afghan refugees' work permit, and these permits' 
limited durations of just six months, mean that many former Afghan refugees have found 
themselves becoming part of an irregular and undocumented Afghan population in Iran because 
of the pressure to return permanently to Afghanistan. In 2007-8, 600,000 Afghans were deported 
from Iran, including many who had formerly held refugee status. A joint ILO-UNHCR study, 
however, indicated that the majority of these migrants would continue to make repeated 
irregular crossings, propelled by the economic insecurity in Afghanistan (ILO-UNHCR 2008) 
In cold economic terms, the cost and restraints imposed on regularised migration mean that it is 
both cheaper and easier to risk repeated deportation rather than pay for permits. These state-
imposed restrictions, however, on Afghans' legal and regularised access to Iranian labour 
markets, have had little impact on Afghan movements in terms of numbers because the 
underlying dynamics, or ‘driver complexes’, have not altered. Instead, Iran has only transformed 
Afghan labour migration from a regularised and open process, which involved temporary stays in 
Iran linked into historical transnational labour networks, into an irregular one that – because 
8 UNHCR (Afghanistan) email correspondence August 2009 
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of the risks involved in crossing the border – may actually result in longer or even permanent 
clandestine residency on the margins of Iranian society. 
In Pakistan, there was arguably room for greater optimism prior to 2009, as the Pakistani state 
sought to recognise the complex dynamics between refugee repatriation, state reconstruction 
and Afghan labour migration could not be ‘solved’ through refugees' premature physical 
return to a weak Afghan state. A 2007 registration exercise saw 2.14 million Afghans 
registered not as refugees but as 'Afghans living in Pakistan', receiving three-year residence 
permits. This was hailed by UNHCR as an 'important milestone', in part because it underlined 
the notion of moving from refugee status towards migrant status under the protection of the 
Afghan government (UNHCR 2008: 14). However, the fragility of the Pakistani state and the 
floods of 2010 have cast doubt on the sustainability of this ‘sustainable repatriation’/labour 
migration connection. 
6.1.4 Changing driver complexes 
In the past decade, Afghan movements to Iran and Pakistan have shifted away from being direct 
responses to physical insecurity caused by conflict and crisis and are now primarily motivated by 
the failure of the Afghan state to provide adequate economic security, particularly for a returning 
refugee population. Whereas Afghan flows were primarily refugee flows in 2000-01, they are 
now irregular labour migrant flows. The reasons for this shift in the nature of Afghan movement 
can be found in the changing driver complexes shaping these migrations. 
While the continuing weakness of the Afghan state is undoubtedly a political consequence of 
decades of civil conflict and continuing physical insecurity, especially in the south of the 
country, motivations for movement to Iran and Pakistan are primarily understood by 
Afghans in economic and livelihood terms. These migration strategies reflect cultural and 
historical norms as well as the ‘lived experiences’ of many Afghans who have spent much of 
their lives in exile. These migrations are family and community-based strategies – rather 
than individual calculations – that connect the political economy of crisis in Afghanistan with 
the political economy of (relative) opportunity perceived to exist in Iran and Pakistan. 
The interests of both these states in removing refugee populations from their territories and 
restricting Afghans' access to labour markets have resulted in numerous policy interventions 
intended to break these historical patterns of transborder labour migration. However, given the 
driver complexes propelling migration out of Afghanistan and towards Iran and Pakistan, such 
policies have not led to any significant reduction in Afghan migration flows, but mean instead that 
Afghan movements are increasingly clandestine, irregular and result in significant protection risks 
for those Afghans moving across the border and into proscribed labour markets. 
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7. The Somalia-southern Africa corridor9 
7.1 Driver complex one: the political economy of conflict and insecurity 
Out-migration from Somalia is a result of human insecurity resulting from endemic conflict and 
an inability to access secure livelihoods. This on-going conflict is the result of the interaction of a 
number of different political, economic and cultural factors within Somalia. There is a close 
relationship between Somali conflict and serious economic underdevelopment, exacerbated by 
environmental factors. 
It is not the intention of this section to provide an analysis of the causes of Somali conflict (for 
this see ICG 2008; Menkhaus 2007; Prunier 1996). However, it is important to understand how 
the particular dynamics of this conflict have influenced the nature of Somali migration. Are 
migration flows precipitated by actual violence or by the longer-term collapse of the Somali 
state’s infrastructure? Do Somalis themselves understand their choices to migrate away from 
conflict as primarily political or economic? 
Currently, conflict in Somalia is centred in the south-central regions. Both Somaliland and 
Puntland regions are relatively non-violent with functioning basic political infrastructure. This is 
important, because migration from northern Somalia (Somaliland) is likely to be qualitatively 
different from migration from the south-central region, driven more by economic 
considerations and/or personal concerns (which could include persecution), rather than 
widespread violence and insecurity. 
Concentrating on migration flows from south-central Somalia – which UNHCR and all 
neighbouring states recognise to be prima facie refugee flows – the majority of those on the 
move are seeking safety away from the armed conflict between the Transitional Federal 
Government of Somalia (TFG) and Al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam and other Islamist groups. This 
conflict has been marked by a consistent failure of all parties to respect basic principles of 
international humanitarian law, resulting in loss of life/serious injuries, destruction of property 
and lack of access to food, medical services and livelihoods (UNHCR 2010). It is therefore the 
absence of a functioning political economy – both in terms of civil distribution and exercise of 
power and its impact on economic space – which provokes flight. However, it should be noted 
that it may in fact be a lull in fighting which actually precipitates population movement (even 
though the causes of this migration are violence and insecurity) (USAID 2010). 
As Somali experts have stressed, some of the clans of south-central Somalia do not – unlike the 
Isaaq clans of Somaliland – have a tradition of seafaring ‘adventure’ and do not make up a 
significant proportion of the Somali diaspora. Groups such as the Digil, the Rahanweyn and the 
non-Somali Juba and Wabi Shebelle valley populations are not traditionally nomadic, but 
sedentary agriculturists who from 1991 onwards have found themselves particularly vulnerable 
to attack by armed militia with terrible economic and political consequences (Prunier 1996: 51). 
9 This section was prepared by Katy Long of the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford 
29 
The impact of this violent destruction on the limited infrastructure that existed pre-1991 in the 
south (its impact emphasised by the agricultural nature of settlement in the region), coupled 
with the inability of competing and factionalised warlords to establish their control over the 
region, has left this south-central region particularly vulnerable to the economic insecurities of 
war and exposed to the rise of politically violent Islamist factions seeking to impose order in the 
region (Menkhaus 2007). It is this continuing conflict – which has intensified since the fall of the 
Islamic Courts Union in Mogadishu in 2006 – which has led to mass displacement, including the 
flight of over 300,000 refugees to Dadaab camp in Kenya. 
Importantly, both the terms of conflict and those of economic survival have also been heavily 
influenced by environmental stress. Persistent rains from March 2010 were causing widespread 
flooding in southern and central Somalia by June, causing widespread destruction of property, 
livestock and crops. At least 6000 additional household displacements were triggered by the 
floods, many moving into IDP camps (DRC 2010). UNHCR also reported a rise in the number of 
refugees arriving in Kenya. Previously, drought has also destroyed livelihoods: in 2005, the 
failure of the short (Deyr) rains led aid agencies to double the numbers targeted for 
humanitarian relief within Somalia, a figure which included 400,000 IDPs (OCHA 2006). 
The conflict drivers of Somalia out-migration can be conceptualised as a complex centring on 
human insecurity. Human insecurity is both political and economic. In the Somali case, the 
absence of rule of law and basic physical security is most problematic because of its economic 
consequences. It is this physical security-economic livelihood connection which drives 
migration, rather than the absence of a broader complement of human or civil rights. This 
‘conflict complex’ is exacerbated by environmental stress and particular cultural vulnerabilities 
among certain groups in south-central Somalia. However, it is also important to note that for 
other south-central groups such as the Ogaaden, and Somalis more generally, close cultural 
affinities with Somali populations in Ethiopia and Kenya and a long history of cross-continental 
diaspora movements may make the direction of Somali movement function as a more positive 
‘choice’ for these groups, and mark the use of migration as a means of maximising their human 
potential. 
7.2 Driver complex two: shaping the journey 
A second collection of drivers combine to shape the nature of Somali journeys to RSA. These 
inter-related factors can be categorised in terms of logistics, culture, economics and policy. 
‘Logistics’ in this sense can be considered to include the practical dimensions of planning a 
journey – particular migration routes available as offered by smuggling networks, the modes 
of transport available and the availability of food or shelter, for example. 
Given that Somali out-migration is driven by conflict and human insecurity, many Somalis – 
particularly those from south-central Somalia – cross the border with Kenya to arrive as 
refugees at Dadaab camp. Although the Kenya-Somalia border has been closed since 2007, this 
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is generally observed, by both Kenyan state officials and international actors, as having had little 
impact on the numbers of Somalis moving through to Dadaab. Between January 2007 and mid-
March 2010, 140,000 Somali refugees were registered in the Dadaab camps, and NGOs have 
estimated that at least the same number have moved through the border region to Nairobi 
without registering (Long 2010). This is an example of a deliberate policy intervention intended to 
divert – or halt – migration flows from Somalia to Kenya , but which has not had this effect, and 
which has made the journey undertaken by Somalis more precarious as they seek to avoid 
recognised and patrolled crossings (HRW 2010; Reuters Africa 2010). 
The prima facie recognition of all south-central Somalis as refugees by Kenya has a significant 
impact on the nature of Somali movement. In combination with the concentration of 
international aid at Dadaab and the presence of a sizeable Somali diaspora at the camps, 
Kenyan asylum policy drives Somalis towards Dadaab. The Kenyan state insists on their 
encampment, heavily curtailing Somali freedom of movement, and prevents Somali access to 
labour markets. It is clear that subsequent onward journeys towards southern Africa are 
heavily influenced by the intersection of cultural values and practices – in particular 
entrepreneurship, migration for trade and the value of business – with policies designed to 
reduce such activities. This means that subsequent Somali onward movements to Nairobi are 
irregular and clandestine, but it does not prevent such movements. It is estimated that up to 
80 per cent of Somali refugees in the East and Horn of African regions will move onwards from 
the place of their initial registration.10 
The labelling of all Somali as ‘refugees’ has also influenced the shape of migration pathways. In 
particular, practices have developed in which refugee camps are used as ‘pitstops’ on journeys 
southwards, with Somalis identifying the camps as points at which international aid can be 
accessed in order to help sustain their continued movement. Up to 80 per cent of Somalis who 
arrive in RSA pass through a single refugee camp, Dzaleka, in Malawi (Long and Crisp 2010; IOM 
2009). In this sense, international policy – the labelling of all Somalis as refugees and a particular 
understanding of what ‘refugee’ and ‘international protection’ involve – combines with logistical 
needs to shape Somali journeys to South Africa. 
Logistical demands, cultural practices, economics and policy also interact in determining the 
nature and power of Somali smuggling networks. Though very little is known about the 
mechanics of Somali smuggling, it is clear that there is a sizeable economy based around people-
smuggling from the Horn of Africa towards southern Africa, generating around US$40m per 
annum (IOM 2009). The strength of the Somali kin and clan networks and a cultural willingness 
to trust in these bonds, as well as the presence of a large diaspora in Nairobi and RSA able to 
fund smuggling and provide information to new arrivals, all strengthen the power of Somali 
smuggling networks in driving Somali migration flows towards southern Africa. 
10 Internal UNHCR paper. 
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Journeys are also shaped by smugglers' interests in avoiding border guards and ensuring 
profitability, often by gathering large numbers of migrants together across circuitous journeys 
through Kenya, Ethiopia and the Great Lake states. A recent development has been an 
increased reliance upon boat travel directly from Somali ports, Kisimayo in the south and 
Bosasso in Puntland (which has traditionally been the site for inter-regional economic migration 
to the Middle East via Yemen), to Pemba, Mozambique, thereby bypassing Tanzanian migration 
controls, which have received considerable investment from IOM and the Tanzanian state 
(Crisp and Kiragu 2010). 
There is also speculation that increased efforts by the international community to deter 
would-be migrants from making the dangerous crossing to Yemen across the Gulf of Aden – 
which have seen the number of Somalis arriving in Yemen drop by up to two-thirds (UNHCR 
2010a) – have led to increased flows towards southern Africa, as smugglers seek to evade 
increased controls and migrants choose less dangerous routes. 
Arguably the most important of all driver complexes in shaping the journey is the interaction 
between cultural expectations, logistical capacity and a migrant's economic class and status. It 
is well recognised that economic status bears a direct relation to the distance travelled by those 
moving (Van Hear 2006). The poorest Somalis are likely to be the 1.5 million IDPs who remain 
within Somalia, and those who remain at Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya. Those who are able 
to move to Nairobi are likely to have more resources; those who are able to move to southern 
Africa are likely to have more resources still, not least because of the high fees demanded by 
the smuggling economy. Access to resources also plays a particular role in determining the 
mode of transport used – the five per cent of Somalis who arrived in South Africa via air are 
likely to be those with the greatest access to finance, both in terms of paying for air tickets and 
in terms of ensuring that they hold the documents necessary to pass through airport 
immigration screening (IOM 2009). 
Economic status is also influenced by Somali cultural practices and depends not only – not even 
primarily – on individual economic wealth, but on family and wider kin connections and 
resources. This is an important point in understanding how kin-based culture affects migration 
flows: not only do diaspora presences shape migration in terms of destination, they also shape 
the nature of the journey, often by providing the necessary economic resources to send one 
member of a family (often a young male) to a destination with the expectation that they will 
support family who remain in refugee camps or in Somalia through remittances. The individual 
may not be the most appropriate unit for analysing driver complexes influencing Somali 
migration, particularly when it comes to understanding the interplay of culture, class and 
logistics. 
7.3 Driver complex three: the political economy of opportunity 
In-coming Somali migration to RSA is a result of a combination of political, economic and 
cultural-historical factors that have resulted in what can be termed a political economy of 
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opportunity. This driver complex, working in tandem with the ‘conflict driver complex’ in 
Somalia, explains why there is a significant migration flow from Somalia towards RSA. 
Since the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa has established a stable, democratic 
government under a constitution which is viewed as one of the most progressive in the world 
and which guarantees ‘all people in our country' (not just citizens or legal migrants) a 
plethora of rights and freedoms (RSA 1996: Article 7). 
However it is unlikely that these rights in themselves account for the direct attraction of RSA for 
Somali refugees and migrants, rather than the human security they frame which allows for 
economic opportunity. Onward movement of Somali refugees from Kenya is driven, above all, 
not by a search to find freedom from persecution or violence, or a search for a ‘survival’ 
livelihood (as this is already provided by the protections offered as ‘asylum’), but by an interest 
in accessing the labour market and maximising economic opportunities. Importantly, South 
Africa (which does not recognise the Somali population on a prima facie basis) allows asylum 
seekers to work. 
In assessing the connections between economics and politics in driving Somali migration to 
RSA, it is important to note that trade and entrepreneurship have a high cultural value for 
Somali populations. The extent of the Somali diaspora and its well-established trading 
networks, not only in RSA but more widely across Africa, in Europe and North America, also 
mean that Somali populations are well-recognised as being extremely effective and 
successful businessmen, who are often able to undercut local salespersons. 
South Africa is the regional economic powerhouse, a middle-income country in a continent of 
low-income and often fragile states. It is closely integrated into the global capitalist economy 
and has excellent transport connections. These economic advantages have helped to facilitate 
the growth of Somali trade links and explain the economic rationale behind Somali migration to 
the region. The size of the South African internal market – RSA GDP per capita (at PPP) was 
US$10,291 in 2009, compared to the Kenyan figure (East Africa's regional economic power) of 
US$1572 – also offers considerable business opportunities (World Bank 2010). 
Somali businessmen were, however, a particular target of the xenophobic attacks which 
occurred in South Africa in May 2008, arguably because of their success in capitalising on the 
economic opportunities offered in South Africa (Polzer 2010). This again reflects the interplay 
of cultural and economic factors: Somali reliance on Somali diaspora trade networks has 
reduced economic and cultural integration within South Africa, leading to a widespread 
perception of the Somalis as foreign interlopers benefiting from but not contributing to South 
Africa's economic growth. It is not yet known how the continuing threat of xenophobic 
retaliation and the consequent deterioration of Somalis' human security within RSA will 
influence Somali migration flows in the long-term. Thousands were displaced at least 
temporarily in 2008. 
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It is also important to consider how important RSA's structural dependence on foreign labour is 
in attracting Somali refugees and migrants. This factor is often cited in explaining intra-regional 
migration from other southern African states, and it undoubtedly plays a key role in explaining 
RSA's relative openness to in-migration in general. Yet, Somalis are broadly traders, 
shopkeepers and business people, rather than labourers. While more research is needed to 
properly map Somali occupations within RSA, the structure of the South African economy – as a 
capitalist market economy governed by a democratic state – is arguably more important to 
Somali assessment of RSA than its structural dependence on foreign labour. 
In sum, the political and economic freedoms afforded by post-apartheid South Africa match 
the cultural values and resources of Somali out-migrants. Somali culture places a high value 
on trade and on economic opportunity rather than aid-dependent subsistence. South Africa's 
constitutional provisions allowing asylum-seekers to work offer this possibility, which is 
denied to those refugees who remain in East Africa. The growth of a large diaspora presence 
in South Africa since 1994 facilitates both economic trade networks and the perpetuation of 
cultural values that encourage migration to South Africa, but impede social integration, in 
contrast to other African migration flows to RSA. 
This driver complex can be termed the Somali political economy of opportunity. Somali 
understandings of the ‘protection’ or human security that they most value centre on an 
economic autonomy that RSA is best placed to provide. This raises important policy questions 
about how best to respond to those populations judged to be in need of ‘international 
protection’ by virtue of the human insecurity they face in their communities of origin in south-
central Somalia, but who do not feel that the security current models of asylum aim to 
provide is sufficient to meet their human potential. 
8. Conclusion 
In DfID’s ‘drivers of change’ analytical framework mentioned at the outset of this paper, it 
was noted that structural features tend to be deeply embedded and to change only slowly; 
institutions are more fluid and more susceptible to change in the medium term. Agents can 
affect the institutional framework and also structural features and processes through the 
mediation of the institutional framework. Likewise, structural features influence agents 
through the mediation of institutions. In this framework, then, institutions were seen as key 
to understanding processes of change and in particular how they would have an impact on 
the poor (DfID 2003: 4). 
This generally accords with the approach adopted in this paper, which has set out a basic 
framework for considering the drivers of migration and has illustrated it by drawing on cases in 
which both ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ migration feature. We first looked at drivers in terms of the 
functions that they fulfil – whether predisposing people to move, prompting movement, actually 
triggering movement, meditating it and shaping it once under way. This preliminary framework 
was applied to migration orders in South-East Asia and between South Asia and the 
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Gulf, as indicative cases. Drivers were then considered in terms of the dimensions they operate 
within – among them locality, scale, duration and depth. The notion of configurations of drivers 
or driver complexes was then suggested and applied to the Afghan and Somali cases, again as 
indicative examples: complexes were identified around the political economy of both acute and 
incremental social change, the political economy of opportunity/expectations, and shaping the 
journey. The cases show how different configurations of political, economic, historical, cultural, 
geographical, environmental factors interact with security, logistical, social status and policy 
dimensions to generate driver complexes operating on different scales, over different times and 
in different locations. The analysis indicates that, like individual drivers, such driver complexes 
may interact with one another and also shift in significance over time. 
The paper points then to the combinations of drivers shaping migration in particular regions 
or corridors and how these configurations influence how people move and where they go. It 
has suggested an analytical and methodological framework which aims to: 
 identify drivers of migration 
 show how they operate in different localities and at different scales 
 show how they change/shift over time 
 assess their depth or tractability 
 show how drivers interact 
 show how drivers have different significance/weights at different times 
 identify which drivers or combinations/complexes are amenable to policy intervention 
Subsequent RPC research within the drivers strand will elaborate and refine the ways we can 
approach these different features. Particular focus is needed on the under-researched 
sphere of drivers of internal migration, and even more so on the linkages between drivers of 
internal and of international migration (King and Skeldon 2010). Among the most challenging 
tasks will be to establish whether, and in what circumstances, some drivers are more 
important than others, and which combinations of drivers are more potent than others. This 
will lay the groundwork for exploration of the possibility that some drivers are amenable to 
policy interventions. 
Development agencies like DfID are unlikely to be able to influence the deeply embedded 
structural predisposing factors that drive migration. Nor are they likely to be able to influence 
precipitating drivers very much, since these are largely events that are difficult to predict. That 
would leave the proximate and mediating ‘drivers’ as fields where there is potential to exercise 
influence. This accords with the ‘drivers of change model’ elaborated earlier (DfID 2003), which 
suggested focusing on institutions that meditate between (deep) structures and agents – this 
makes sense in the migration context as in other development settings. However, as this paper 
has tried to show, it is not simply a matter of influencing particular drivers, since these may 
combine to form configurations which may have aggregate effects different from the particular 
drivers they combine – the whole is different from the sum of the parts. This means that 
addressing one driver alone may not have the intended effect: policy interventions will 
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therefore need to take account of such configurations and their effects. In this regard, work on 
the drivers theme will need to take account of the findings from the Foresight project on Global 
Environmental Migration (BIS 2011), which seeks to understand how environmental factors 
interact with other drivers of change to shape migration orders, as well as broader Europe-wide 
consultations on climate change and migration (European Commission 2008). Work within the 
theme will also underline the now often-made point that to influence migration a 
comprehensive approach is needed, including not just migration policies, but policy levers that 
have a wider reach – such as those covering trade, fiscal matters, welfare, security and so on – 
as well as taking account of the unintended effects of policies on migration over time (de Haas 
2011). 
Finally, much of course depends on the goals of intervention – whether the purpose is to 
prevent or control migration, to reduce migration pressure, to enable people to choose 
whether to move or not, or to engage with migration flows in order to reduce poverty and 
optimise development. We take it that DfID would align its purpose with the latter end of this 
range of goals. The identification of combinations of particular drivers of migration in particular 
places will prepare interested parties for the kinds of migration that are most likely to emerge. 
The overall purpose of RPC work would be to seek an understanding of drivers in order to lay 
the basis for steering migration – or some forms of migration – towards the goal of reducing 
poverty and where possible promoting development. 
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